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IN THE SUPREM.E co~ URT
of the
STATE· OF UITAH
FIREMEN'S INSURAN·C·E C 0 M P ANY OF NE·W AR.K, NEW JERSE·Y

'

Plaintiff,

-vs.-

Case No.

10240

PHILLIP. L. GO·RDON and NEIL
GO·RDO·N,
Defendants.
APPELLAN'T 'S· BRIEF
S·T AT·E ·M ENT· OF F ACTiS
STAT·E ;M ENT· OF THE KIND OF ·C:A SE
This is an action for recovery of a subrogation claim
paid by and assigned to the plaintiff, arising out of a
collision where the automobile of the plaintiff's assured
(Ivan Johnson) was damaged and the insured Mr. Johnson was injured when an automobile owned by one defendant and driven by the other skidded onto the wrong
side of the highway.

Dii SP·O·S ITIO·N IN LOWER CO~URT
The case was tried before the trial judge. From a
judgment of no cause of action bas<·d on a finding that
no negligence of defendant proxiinately caused the accident, plaintiff appeals.
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REL,IEF SOUGHT ON AP'PEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment, and judgment in its favor as a matter of lavv·, or that failing, a
new trial.

The accident occurred December 27, 1960, on Sunnyside Avenue in Salt L·ake :City about 140 feet west of
Padley Street, where Sunnyside runs east and west with
private residences on the south and Fort Douglas on the
north. The roads were dry, the weather was clear, and
the visibility was good. Phillip Gordon, driving the auto~
mobile of Neil Gordon was traveling west on Sunnyside
Avenue traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour, one and onehalf car lengths behind a second car. Phillip Gordon
failed to notice until it was too late for him to stop, that
a third west-bound car had stopped to turn left at Padley
Street, which interseets Sunnyside from the south. ·Traveling too fast to stop or slow down sufficiently, following to close behind the second car, and failing to observe
the third car sufficiently early, Phillip Gordon swerved
to the right onto the shoulder where he traveled some
distance before his car skidded sidewards back across
the west bound lane, across the center line, and still
skidding sidewards in the east bound lane, struck with
the side of defendant's car the front end of Ivan Johnson's vehicle which was facing east in the east bound
lane. I van Johnson had been traveling less than 30 miles
per hour and braked sufficiently to be almost stopped
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at the time he was struck. The impact knocked Johnson
approxirnately nine feet to the south. The record contains no indication of any negligence by Johnson.
At the time of the accident Phillip L. Gordon was
using the automobile of Neil Gordon with gasoline furnished by Neil Gordon for the purpose of going to P·ark
City and bringing Neil Gordon's girl friend to Salt Lake
City to meet Neil Gordon about 5:00 P.~1. when he got
off work so that Neil Gordon and the girl friend could
keep a social engagement. (Deposition of Neil Gordon,
Pages 3 and 11, D:eposition of Phillip Gordon, P'ages 4
and 5.) Phillip L. Gordon was married at the time, but
his brother Neil Gordon was unmarried. Phillip L.
Gordon did not have a license and never had had one
when Neil Gordon entrusted him with the automobile.
(Record 72, 74 and Etxhihit P-11.)
At the time of the collision Phillip L. Gordon did not
have and never had had a driver's license (record 72).
Phillip Gordon was driving westward and slightly downhill on Sunnyside Avenue at 50 to 60 miles pe-r hour
(record 72-73). At that point Sunnyside Avenue has a
residential neighborhood to the south and a military
reservation to the north. Phillip Gordon believed the
speed limit to be 30 or 40 miles per hour (Phillip Gordon
Deposition, Page 6, Line 7). Phillip Gordon drove 50 to
60 miles per hour as he was following another car at one
and one-half car lengths distance (Exhibit P-11, P·age 2;
Neil Gordon Deposition, Page 12, Line 11). Although the
visibility was good Phillip Gordon failed to obse-rve until
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too late a third car stop to turn south on Padley Street
(Record 66; D:eposition of Phillip Gordon, page 7, lines
6-13; page 15, L,ine 17, page 6, Lines 11-15). Phillip had
good brakes and applied them (Deposition of Phillip
Gordon, page 15, line 23, page 17, line 25).
The car ahead of defendant Gordon turned around
the car waiting for the turn. Defendant Gordon was
going too fast to stop and swerved to the right to avoid
the stopped car and plowed furrows in the shoulder for
a considerable distance (Record 75, 76, 79). Phillip Gordon failed to keep control of the car and skidded in a
southwesterly direction vvith the car traveling in a sideways fashion rather than rolling forward. As the skidding car made a curving path across the west bound lane,
across the center of the highway into the east bound lane,
it still had a momentum of 25-30 miles per hour (record
72,, 73, 76, 77, Exhibit P-7, Deposition of Phillip Gordon,
page 8, line 8, page 14, line 20, page 10, line 20). Phillip
Gordon did not see the Johnson car until it was 30 or
40 feet away (Deposition of Phillip Gordon, page 9, line
26). The right side of the defendants' car struck the
front of the Johnson vehicle knocking the Johnson
vehicle slightly back and forcing the front end of the
Johnson car nine feet to the south ahnost at right angles
(Record 68). Both autos "\vere extensively damaged.
The investigating officer determined the probable
point of impact by means of the right angle veering to
the south as the front wheels of the Johnson vehicle were
forced to skid sidewards. Point of imp-act was 140 feet
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·west of Padley Street and six feet south of the center
line of Sunnyside A venue (the east bound lane was 15
feet wide and the probable point of impact was nine feet
north of the south edge of Sunnyside) (Record 69, 70).
The defendants' car stopped facing east in the southern
half of the road (Exhibit P-7).
The Johnson car left 30 feet of skid marks in the
east bound lane. The officer estimated the speed of
Johnson to have been less than 30 miles per hour before
the emergency, and also estimated the Johnson car to
have been stopped or almost stopped when hit by the
defendant and forced to the south (Record 76). Phillip
Gordon did not complain of or suggest that there was
any negligence on Johnson's part at the time of the
police investigation, at the time he signed a written statement for the adjuster (Exhibit p·-11) or at the taking of
his deposition. Phillip Gordon in his deposition denied
any knowledge of any improper driving by Johnson
(Deposition of Phillip Gordon, page 17, line 7).
Salt Lake City Police Officer Oscar J. Hendrickson
investigated. He measured 30 feet seven inches of skid
marks proceeding due east in the eastbound lane of
Sunnyside Avenue made by the .Johnson vehicle, and
leading to the point of impact, where the front wheels
then skidded abruptly at right angles and veered south
nine feet (Record 68, 69). The officer observed that the
defendant car had plowed furrows for sorne distance in
the shoulder at the north sid<} of NunnysidP Avenue
(Record 70, Line 17), and that the defendant car skidd<}d
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on the hard surface in a curving line southwesterly across
the westbound lane of Sunnyside and part of the eastbound lane of Sunnyside leaving skid marks of 63 feet
8 inches with the left front wheel and 40 feet 8 inches
with the left rear wheel (Record 70). D'efendant struck
Johnson 6 feet south of the center line of Sunnyside
(Record 70). Defendant Phillip Gordon stated his version of the accident to the investigating officer and the
officer recorded Phillip Gordon's version in his notes as
follows: "I came· west on Sunnyside A venue from Immigration Canyon, approaching 2200 East, following
another car. The car ahead of me swerved to the left
around a stopped car. I went around the right side to
avoid the stopped ear and hit the soft dirt and skidded
sideways down the road and was hit by another car.
Estimate of speed approaching the accident scene, 50 or
60 miles per hour. Estin1ate of speed at the time of the
collision, 30 miles per hour (Record 72 and 73).
I van Johnson was too badly injured in the accident
to be interviewed by the officer (Record 73, 74).
The officer's diagram was admitted as Exhibit P-7,
with the vehicles located as he found them, the defendant
vehicle as No. 1 and Johnson as No. 2 (Record 66, 67).
Shortly after the accident defendant Phillip Gordon
gave to Mr. Severe, adjuster for ·Crawford & Company,
a statement which 'vas reduced in writing and read and
approved and signed by Phillip Gordon. A copy was
admitted as E.xhibit P-11 (Record 101, 103, 105).
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Damages were found by the trial court to be as
alleged and testified by plaintiff (Record 271 Findings of
Fact, Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8).
I van Johnson was alert, energetic, and fully active
before his injury, making about $27,000.00 a year (Record 90). He was incapacitated by his injuries and his
income fell off drastically (R.ecord 91, and 9'2) and he
never regained his formed state of health or earning
capacity. (Mr. Johnson died before the time of trial of
causes other than his injuries). Mr. Johnson retained
counsel and claimed not only property damages but payment unde-r the "Uninsured Motorist 'C'overage" provision of his policy with plaintiff.
Johnson's vehicle was damaged in the sum of $860.72.,
of which plaintiff paid $810.72. Prior to payment Mr.
Severe, an adjuster, took reasonable precautions to accomplish the repairs at the lowest price· (E\xhihit P -2;
Exhibit P-5; Record 46, 47, 95, 96 and 97; Deposition of
Neil Gordon, page 9, line 2).
Mter prolonged negotiation with Ivan Johnson and
his attorney the plaintiff paid Johnson $5,000.00 for his
damages arising out of personal injury, and as subrogee
under the policy, took the assignment of Mr. Johnson's
claim against the defendants (Exhibit P'-3; Exhibit P-6;
Record48, 50, 60, 61, 62, 65).
A copy of Johnson's insurance policy was admitted
as Exhibit P -1.
The trial court in its memorandurn decision denied
recovery for the reasons set forth in Paragraph 4,
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Memorandum Decision (R.ecord 23), as follows: urrhe
Court has carefully considered the testimony adduced in
open court, together with the depositions of the defendants, and although it may appear from the depositions
and the evidence that the defendant, Phillip L. Gordon,
may have been negligent prior to the accident in question
that negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident
in question, and the Court, therefore, finds and concludes
that Phillip L. Gordon was not negligent in any of the
manners set forth in the P'retrial Order or in any other
manner, and that the case should therefore be dismissed."·
POINT ONE.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN OMITTING TO FIND NEGLIGENCE BY PHILLIP GORDON;
PHILLIP GORDON WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.

The evidence, credible and undisputed, shows that
Phillip Gordon breached his duties as a driver in several
respects. He did not come up to the standard of care of
a reasonable prudent driver under the circumstances
with respect to several duties of a driver which are so
well established and familiar that they are embodied in
standard instructions to juries:
Duty to use reasonable care to keep a lookout for
other vehicles, obstacles, or other conditions reasonably
to be anticipated. JIFU, 21.1A
Duty to keep his car und~r reasonably safe and
1)roper control. JIF,U 21.1B
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Duty to drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, having due
regard to the width, surface and condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, the visibility and any actual or
potential hazards then existing. JIFU, 21.1C
Duty not to follow another vehicle more closely than
is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for his own
speed, the speed of such other vehicle, other traffic upon
the highway, and all other conditions there existing, and
to keep at such a distance and maintain such control of
his automobile as is reasonable and prudent for the
safety of himself and other. JIFU, 21.1D
Duty to drive his automobile on his own right side
of the highway, JIFU, 21.1G, 41-6-53 UCA, 1953.
Duty not to attempt to pass another vehicle until he
1nakes observation and ascertains that this can be done
with reasonable safety under the circumstances. JIFlT,
21.1H, 41-6-55

uc,A, 1953.

Duty to attempt to overtake and pass another vehicle
upon the right only under conditions permitting such
movement in safety and in no event to attempt such
movement by driving off the pavement or main traveled
portion of the roadway. 41-6-56, Subsection (h), UCA.
1953.
POINT TWO.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
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THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PHILLIP
GORDON; AS A MATTER OF LAW THE NEGLIGENCE OF
PHILLIP GORDON WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT.

The proximate cause of the accident and the resulting damage was the negligence of defendant Phillip
Gordon which caused the vehicle he ,,~as driving to cross
the center line and go onto the wrong side of the road
and collide with the Johnson vehicle.
The fact that a motorist is on the wrong side of the
road at the time of a headon collision alone raises a
presumption of negligence by the driver on the wrong
side of the road. Wood 1./S. Strevell-Paterson Hardware
Company, Supreme 'Court of Utah, 19'57l 313 P'ac. 2d 800;
6 Utah 2d 340. There is no evidence in the record to
overcome this presumption. The above case held that
evidence that one driver was three feet over the center
line was ample evidence to establish that the negligence
of that driver was the proximate cause of the collision.
In Xenakis, et al vs. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc.,
Supreme ,c·ourt of Utah, 1954, 265 P. 2d 1007; 1 Utah
2d 299, the jury found that the Studebaker occupied by
plaintiffs had crossed the center line into the wrong lane
to collide with the defendants' truck. In affirming the
judgment for the defendants the Supreme Court of Utah
stated: "The defendant's truck having remained on its
own side, there was no factor of negligence on the part
of the defendant which, even if found to e:xist, would
have contributed to the cause of the accident. If the
Studebaker had kept on its right side ... the truck could
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have proceeded safely down its own right side of the
highway with brakes ever so faulty, or with none at all,
without any collision occurring.
"The fact that there was no negligence of the defendant contributing as a proximate cause of the collision,
leaves the Studebaker going over onto the wrong side as
the sole proximate cause.... "
POINT THREE.
UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF
PHILLIP GORDON IS IMPUTABLE TO DEFENDANT NEIL
GORDON.

Neil Gordon gave his brother Phillip Gordon, an
unlicensed driver, authority and direction to drive Neil
Gordon's car to the place where Neil Gordon's girl friend
lived and to drive her back to Salt Lake City to meet
Neil Gordon. At the time of the accident Phillip Gordon
as agent was doing on behalf of Neil Gordon exactly
what he had been authorized to do by Neil Gordon, his
principal.
The presumption of agency from the mere· fact of
ownership of an automobile imputes the driver's negligence to the owner, and it then becomes the responsibility
of the owner to show that the negligence should not be so
imputed. Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah, 65, 102 Pac. 2d 493.
Defendants gave no evidence whatsoever tending to rebut
the presumption of agency which ariHPs frorn Phillip
Gordon driving Neil Gordon's car.
Agency is not lirnited to an employPP in a eomrnercial
venture. A member of a family or a friend or acquain-
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tance who is gratitously perfor1ning an errand for the
owner of a car may be the agent when acting within the
authority of the car owner.
In Cochran vs. Allyn, 16 Wise. 2d 20, 113 N.W. 2d
538, defendant, who was in the hospital, asked his mother
to drive defendant's car to their jointly owned cottage
to shut off the water for the winter, and the mother, while
driving to the cottage, was involved in an accident which
injured plaintiff. It \Vas found that the mother-driver
was acting as agent for the car owner.
In Powels, et al vs. Ginsberg, 245 Wise. 45, 13 N.W.
2d 448 (19'44) defendant's brother drove defendant in
defendant's car to a restaurant to meet defendant's wife
for lunch, and the defendants' brother in opening the
door struck the plaintiff. Holding that the brother was
the agent of the defendant car owner the court cited the
R.estatement of Agency as follows : "Section 1 (1).
A:gency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act."
In Nallie vs. Peters, et al, 241 N. Y. 177, 149 N.E.
343, defendant-owner Peters asked a friend to take the
plaintiff N allie on a pleasure ride. Owner-Peters was
not in the car when the friend's driving resulted in
dan1age to N allie. The court held that evidence tending
to establish thP above 'vould support a finding of agency
evl~n though the friend was to receive no coinpensation,
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and the issue should be submitted to the jury. ·The court
stated:
"If Mondrone were driving Peters' car at his
(P'eters') request on his (Peters') business or
enterprise, acting in this particular as his servant
or agent, Peters would be liable for his (Mondrone's) negligence. Whether or not he was to
receive pay would merely be evidence bearing
upon the question. Peters might be liable, even
though Mondrone was to receive no compensation.
Althorfe v. Wolfe} 22 N. Y. 355; Wyllie v. p,almerJ
137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381, 19 L.R.A., 285. We
think that there was evidence in this case from
which the jury might find, or reasonably infer,
that Mondrone was driving for the defendant, at
his request, and for his benefit, that at the time
of the accident he was engaged on the defendant's
business or undertaking. Even one acting under
such circumstances as a volunteer might render
the owner of the car liable ... The liability for
the acts of another is not dependent upon the
strict relationship of master and servant, but
upon relationship of similar natureJ when one
acts for another, at his request, express or implied, for his benefit, and under his directions.
Under such circumstances, the negligence of the
agent is the negligence of the master or the principal. Lowell vs. Williams} 183 App. Div. 701, 170
N.Y.S. 5·96; affirmed 228 N.Y. 59'2, 127 N.E. 916;
Orlando v. Pioneer Barber Towel Supply Co., 2·39
N. Y. 342, 146 N. E·. 621; Ferris v. Sterling} 214
N.Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406, Ann. Cas. 1916-D 1161.
:1:

* *"

'
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Dobson-P.eacock vs. Curtis, 166 Va. 550, 186, S.E. 13,
held an owner who was not in the automobile at the time
of the accident to he liable for the negligence of a gratituous driver who was not paid for driving.
In Cannon vs. Dupree (Tex.) 29-4 S.W. 298, the
owner of a vehicle who was not riding in the vehicle at
the time of the accident was held liable for the negligence
of a friend who was gratituously operating the vehicle at
the request of the owner. The court stated:

"When Mr. ·T·a ylor was directed and intrusted
to drive the automobile on the remaining part of
the contemplated journey to Rodger's Lake, as a
substitute to relieve the . appellant, who had been
driving, he for the time became her driver; and
that he undertook to drive at her request can make
no difference. When he was directed to assume,
and was intrusted with, control of the automobile
as a driver, he was, for all purposes of a driver,
her representation as special servant in legal
view; and if careless, and injury resulted to occupants of the car, the owner vvas liable to the same
extent as if he were the regularly employed
driver. The driving was an act incident to service,
and such special service was done by Mr. Taylor
for the benefit of the owner of the automobile. 1
L:abbott on Master and S·e rvant, Sec. 22. As a
general rule, authority may he conferred by one
person upon another to do specially an act for
him without any agreement to compensate him
and without any binding undertaking on the part
of such latter person to execute the auth or1•ty. "
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See also Acosta v. Smith, La. App., 23 So. 2d 742,
and Butter v. Smith, La. App., 23 So. 2d 745; Prickett v.
Whapples, 10 ~Cal. App. 2d 701, 52 P. 2d 972; Rubin v.
Schupp, 127 F. 2.d 6:25.
Respectfully submitted,

J. ROYAL AND~RE·A.S~E~N
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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